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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RENT WITHHOLDING AcT-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that the Rent Withholding Act is not an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative authority, despite the fact that
it leaves to the Department of Licenses and Inspections the task of
applying the concepts of "fit and unfit for human habitation"; nor
does it act as an unconstitutional taking of landlords' property without
due process of law.
DePaul v. Kaufman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971).
Appellants were owners of a multi-unit apartment building which the
City of Philadelphia certified as "unfit for human habitation."' Pur-
suant to the Rent Withholding Act2 rents were withheld and paid
to the appellee, as escrow agent. The appellants obtained a preliminary
injunction restraining the appellee from returning any of the escrow
fund to the tenants. The Court of Common Pleas subsequently dis-
solved the preliminary injunction and the present appeal followed.
According to the terms of the Act if a dwelling is certified as "unfit
for human habitation" the tenant's rents are placed in an escrow ac-
count. If the building is re-certified as "fit" within six months all the
rents in the fund are payable to the landlord, but if at the termination
of six months the building remains "unfit" all escrow funds are re-
turned to the tenants. The Act also provides that no tenant can be
evicted for any reason during the rent suspension period.
The court reasoned that while the legislature may not delegate the
power to make law,3 it may establish adequate standards and order
the appropriate agency to effectuate the declared legislative policy.
4
The court determined that standards to promote the health, safety,
and general public welfare were constitutionally specific;5 and that
among the legitimate objects for such regulation were laws to insure
adequate, decent, and safe housing.6
1. DePaul v. Kaufman, 441 Pa. 386, 390, 272 A.2d 500, 502 (1971).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Act].
3. 441 Pa. at 391, 272 A.2d at 503, citing Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Allegheny
County Board of School Directors, 418 Pa. 520, 529, 211 A.2d 487, 495 (1965).
4. Id.
5. 441 Pa. at 393, 272 A.2d at 504, citing Nolan v. Jones, 263 Pa. 124, 131, 106 A. 235,
237 (1919); See, e.g., Euclid v. Amber Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. 441 Pa. at 394, 272 A.2d at 504, citing Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921)
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The court stated there was no taking of property without due
process of law. Due process demands only that the law should not
be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means se-
lected have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to
be obtained.7 The court analyzed each of the limitations the Act
placed on landlords' rights,8 determined that none of them were un-
reasonable, and that they all bore a substantial relation to the objec-
tive sought by the legislature. This objective is to assure decent and
habitable rental property by giving tenants the power to put pressure
on landlords to repair dilapidated and unsafe dwellingsY
The common law rule was that the tenant had the duty to make
any and all repairs; this was reasonable when applied to an agrarian
economy where the tools and materials were at hand, and where the
tenant was capable of making the repairs himself.' 0 The doctrine of
caveat emptor was applied to the lessee; the tenant took the land as
he found it," and only an actual physical eviction by the landlord
would relieve the tenant of his duty to pay rent.12
As the law evolved the concept of constructive eviction was devel-
oped, and the tenant's duty to pay rent was terminated when he had
no beneficial use and enjoyment of leased premises.'3 If the tenant
continued to occupy the premises after the occurrence of acts which
constituted a constructive eviction he waived the eviction and his duty
to pay rent continued. 14 Later, judicial cognizance was made of a ten-
ant's right to remain in possession and not pay rent even though con-
ditions sufficient to constitute a constructive eviction were present but
"Housing is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest justifying some de-
gree of public control are present." See also Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 290, 243
A.2d 395, 398 (1965).
7. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1933).
8. 441 Pa. at 395-398, 272 A.2d at 505-506. A summary of the limitations: a tenant
may not remain in possession without paying rent to the escrow agent, the Act does not
require renewal of the lease if it expires during the rent suspension period but rather
only an extension of the original lease, the Act permits but does not require that the
improvements be made entirely within the amount deposited in the escrow fund, the
rent is to be lost if the repairs are not completed within the statutory period, and the
tenant cannot be evicted for any reason during the withholding period. See also Klien
v. Allegheny County Health Department, 441 Pa. 1, 269 A.2d 647 (1970) which permits
the tenant to remain in occupancy for as many rent periods as are necessary to complete
the repairs, and which implies that the landlord will lose each six month rent accumu-
lation if the repairs are not completed.
9. 441 Pa. at 394, 272 A.2d at 504.
10. 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.78 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
11. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 63, at 400 (3d ed. 1968).
12. Hunt v. Coup, 98 Eng. Rep. 1065 (K.B. 1775).
13. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826); Hoeveler v. Fleming, 91 Pa. 322 (1879).
14. Harper & Bros. Company v. Jackson, 240 Pa. 312, 87 A. 430 (1913).
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not acted upon by the tenant. One of the earliest judicial recognitions
of this right was made in 1917,15 and as late as 196916 courts (without
statutory backing) had permitted tenants to withhold rent until the
premises were repaired and habitable.
Before the Pennsylvania courts had the opportunity to recognize
the concept of rent withholding the legislature drafted the Rent With-
holding Act. However, in drafting the bill they left several ambigu-
ities, and as was predicted by the Superior Court in 196917 the vague
sections of the statute were interpreted by the Supreme Court in the
absence of subsequent legislative amendment. Though the court re-
solved the Act's ambiguities it is suggested that all the legal problems
posed by the Act have not yet been fully reflected upon.
It is obvious that the Rent Withholding Act has given many new
rights to the tenant as did the Landlord-Tenant Act of 1951.18 The
question yet to be considered by the courts is what will occur if stan-
dard form leases 9 are devised which will require the tenant to waive
his rights under the Rent Withholding Act as has already been done
with the Landlord-Tenant Act.20 Such a lease could either waive the
Act in its entirety, or require the tenant to waive the more common
violations of the county housing and health codes which are consid-
ered in determining if a dwelling is "unfit." The latter is the more
invidious. By waiving, individually, the more common point accu-
mulating violations21 the legislative purpose is negated.
The purpose of the Rent Withholding Act is to aid in assuring the
public health, safety, and welfare by having decent rental housing
available. 2 To permit tenants to waive, by the mechanism of a stan-
dard form lease, conditions adversely affecting either their own, or
the public's health, safety, and welfare would be directly opposed to
the purpose of the Act. The obvious solution to this problem would
be for the legislature to amend the Act prohibiting the waiver of any
15. Fifth Avenue Building Company v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 11 N.E. 579 (1917).
16. Dorfman v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
17. National Council of Mechanics v. Roberson, 214 Pa. Super. 9, 20, 248 A.2d 861, 866
(1969).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.11-397 (1951).
19. Reference will be made to standard form leases; however, the concepts developed
are not limited in application to standard form leases.
20. See, Fontana v. Miller, 116 P.L.J. 422 (1968).
21. Twenty points are needed for a dwelling to be classified as unfit in Allegheny
County. For an analysis of the Act's implementation in Allegheny County see Clough,
Pennsylvania's Rent Withholding Law, 73 DIcK. L. REV. 583 (1968).
22. 441 Pa. at 394, 272 A.2d at 504.
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of its provisions. In the absence of such legislation the courts may be
called upon to determine if such a waiver is valid.
The court will have at least two approaches available to prohibit
the waiver of the Act's benefits. One approach would be for the court
to recognize that a standard form lease is not an interest in real prop-
erty, as it was at the common law,23 but rather a contract.24 Viewed
as a contract, standard form leases could be included under the rele-
vant warranty sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. 25 Although
the Uniform Commercial Code permits the disclaimer of any or all
warranties of fitness, 26 it has been held in numerous cases that such
a disclaimer is void if it is contrary to public policy.27 Thus, an at-
tempted waiver of housing or safety codes could be held void as
against public policy.
The more probable method which the court may use to hold a
waiver of the Act's benefits invalid involves little departure from
stare decisis. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized in
Boyd v. Smith25 the general concept that where legislative action is
intended for the preservation of human life, safety, and welfare,
public policy does not permit an individual to waive the protection
which the statute in question was designed to afford him.29
The purpose of housing and safety codes is to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare, and to place the burden of building safety
on the landlord.3 Exculpatory clauses which attempt to circumvent
the public policy as enunciated by the legislature have been held
void.31 Agreements between individuals cannot set aside a clear and
23. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 317 (1855).
24. See generally Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate or Contract, 16 TEXAS L. REV.
47 (1937); Note, The California Lease-Contract or Conveyance? 4 STAN. L. REv. 244 (1952);
6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (3d ed. Jaeger, 1962); 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 686 (rev. ed.
1960).
25. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2 (1962):
[T]he warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those
lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined
... to sales contracts....
26. Id. § 2-316.
27. For an extensive listing of these cases see Jaeger, The Warranty of Habitability, 46
CHI-KENT L. REv. 123, 133 (1969).
28. 372 Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953). In Boyd, § 4 of the Act of June 13, 1915, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 15002 (1957) required fire escapes on multi-storied rental dwellings. The
landlord did not provide one and personal injury resulted from a fire from which there
was no escape. The court held as void a clause exempting the landlord from any personal
or property damage resulting from a fire.
29. Id. at 310, 94 A.2d at 46.
30. Gilpin v. Abraham, 218 F. Supp. 414, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1963), appeal dismissed, 328
F.2d 884 (1964).
31. Id.
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unequivocal legislative determination of public policy; 2 therefore,
any attempt to waive local health or housing code violations should
be declared void.
This concept of prohibiting waiver of local housing regulations as
applied to rent withholding laws has already been recognized by the
California courts.33 Indeed, Common Pleas Courts in Pennsylvania
have extended Boyd 34 to nullify clauses in leases which have violated
local safety ordinances. 35
The courts, having already prohibited the waiver of public policy
as declared by the legislature in the form of health and safety laws,
should have little difficulty in prohibiting the waiver of local health
and housing ordinances which are utilized to effect the legislative pur-
pose behind the Rent Withholding Act.
It should be noted that the court, in holding the Act constitutional
and interpreting it to the tenant's advantage, has indicated that it rec-
ogriizes the importance of the rent withholding concept. This legis-
lative and judicial mandate can be frustrated if landlords are permitted
to devise leases which will cause tenants to waive the benefits the Rent
Withholding Act was designed to afford them.
Mark Louis Glosser
MALPRACTICE-VIARIOus LIABILITY OF AN OPERATING SURGEON--The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that a trial judge may not
direct a jury verdict on the issue of the vicarious liability of an op-
erating surgeon for the negligence of his assistants.
Thomas v. Hutchinson, 442 Pa. 118, 275 A.2d 23 (1971).
Plaintiff underwent surgery for a ruptured disc. After Dr. Hutchinson
successfully removed the disc he left the operating room, leaving the
closing of the incision to three orthopedic residents. These residents,
employees of the hospital, had been selected to assist in this operation
by the operating room supervisor, also an employee of the hospital.
32. Bell v. McAnulty, 349 Pa. 384, 386, 37 A.2d 543, 544 (1941).
33. Buchner v. Azuali, 251 Cal. App. Supp. 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967). See gener-
ally Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 920 (1969).
34. 372 Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953).
35. Maglin v. Weinberg, 21 D. & C.2d 630 (1959) defective fire escape; Fegley v. Pinsker,
104 P.L.J. 73 (1955) defective furnace; Harris v. Greenberg, 17 D. & C.2d 1966 (1968) de-
fective stairs and poor lighting; cf. Bowman v. McGillick, 104 P.L.J. 484 (1956).
